In Europe there is some political commitment to present democracy as core european value. This centres on the conviction that Europe offers a model of political harmony both within and among states that is highly relevant to some other parts of the world, not least the zones of conflict, because it shows how to rise above centuries of interstate violence.
Soft power: The European Union (EU) speaks softy and carries a big carrot is one way of describing this approach.
Europe having been at the heart of two world wars and one cold war in the twentieth century alone.
The political vlues on which this stability in Europe has been constructed are for Europe to demonstrate and to share, not by exporting democracy aggressively but by engaging in processes for stability and peace defined by partnership and ideological suasion.
Early state formation places particular emphasis on ideology. The move towards depersonalized, rationalized administration could only occur against the backdrop of a dramatic shift in collective beliefs. On the one hand this entailed the emergence of a sense of individuality and were indicative of changes in perceptions of right political order.
European liberal thought: the right of the individual; the natural equality of all men; the artificial character of the political order (which led to the later distinction between civil society and the state)
An order which could emerge by rational design rather than religious mandate. Observation regarding the emergence of individualism in twelfth-century England has an important bearing on this and the rise of early states.
The new states of the post-1945 era emerged in a completely different security environment than the states of early modern Europe. Thus, state formation in Europe presents a angles to clarify how sovereign territoriality became the constitutive rule for the modern state system and why some states developed a constitutional or absolutist regimes, and how some states created rational administrative structures which others lacked. European variants on liberal democracy also seem more attractive.
Nowhere is this more pertinent than in the newly independent states that emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century. Indeed, since the end of the Second Word War the number of independent states has multiplied almost fourfold.
A strong sense of the value of democracy and a desire to see it spread far and wide have never been absent from the Western world during the period since 1945. Even before then, the dismantling of European empires in Africa and Asia saw attempt to implant formal democratic structures of government. Weiner (1987) and Payne (1993) among others have suggested that British colonial heritage contributes to better prospects for democracy, and Barro (1996) finds support for their clams. But it was the end of the cold war that signaled a quantitative shift in willingness to adopt democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal.
Democracy is once again proving to be the best, most stable way of dealing with political challenges. And yet, at the same time democracy, more than any other system, demands statesmanship and courageous leadership.
In the last two decades, democracy has become the dominant system of government across the world, both as a normative ideal and as a fact. The intrinsic value of freedom and democracy may be considered so great that societies which already enjoy these properties feel obliged to help other societies share them too. This is relevant to North Africa and especially in Syria and many places in the Arab world, the Middle East peace process. Nowhere will it be more true than in Syria, the biggest failure of the international community in decades.
The European Union has been a major exponent of political conditionality as distinctive approach to promoting democracy. The EU´s Copenhagen criteria in 1993 lay down conditions referring to stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities´for eligibility to join the EU.
Close observers differ on the details, but most acknowledge that a structure of incentives to undertake democratic reform this conditionality has been very effective in pushing the democratization of post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
The European Union (EU) speaks softy and carries a big carrot is one way of describing this approach.
The result may lead adopted democratic practices to become deeply embedded even after prize of positive reform conditionality such as EU membership has been won and its incentive power has obsolesced.
The instruments, methods, or approaches that employed in promoting democracy directly can be placed along a continuum running from soft power to hard power.
Soft power: a concept developed by Joseph Nye to describe the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, use force. The term is now widely used in international affairs by analysts and statesmen. For Nye, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes you want.
It can be contrasted with ‘hard power’, which is the use of coercion and payment. However if power is defined in narrowly coercive terms, then the full continuum spans assistance, persuasion, influence, and incentives on the one side. On the other side it includes: pressure a diplomatic pressure for instance and political conditionalities, especially negative conditionalities that embody threats in the event of non-compliance, sanctions, either threatened or actural, and covert and over military intervention.
Soft power can be wielded not just by states but also by all actors in international politics, such as NGOs or international institutions. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.
In practice different methods or approaches are often employed simultaneously. Alternatively they may be employed in sequence depending on the political circumstances and political trajectory of the countries on the receiving end.
Democracy promotion is not licence to do anything in the name of advancing the cause. There are, at least in principle, constraints in international law. Not even the UN is legally entitled to try to impose democracy by force.
The limited circumstances whereby the UN Security Council may authorize military intervention in the internal affairs of a country against the will of its government were narrowly defined at a time when the idea of state sovereignty was paramount.
In the first instance they require that the country be regarded as threat to others, such as exporting instability to the sorrounding region.
The variety of available methods or approaches to democracy promotion that range from democracy assistance, soft power and linkage, all the way to attempt to impose democracy by force, suggest that governmental and intergovernmental democracy promoters in particular face major questions of strategy:
That means questions about what to do, where, and more especially how to go about it.
Democracy promotion faces enormous challenges in societies coming out of violent conflict and especially those where the state is fragile or still not very effective, that is, failing or, even worse, close to collapse. An increasing number of such cases from Afghanistan to the Democratic Republic of Congo have come to attention in the unstable politics of the post-cold war world.
The region that the twenty-first century has come to the fore in the thinking of democracy promotion´s supporters is the Middle East. This is both because liberal democracy has made least progress there and because political reform in countries like Egypt, Syria, and Iran is now seen to be vital to Western security interest And its strategy for promoting democracy there.
The past twenty years have seen a steady decline in the number and severity of wars; but the Middle east is now bucking this trend. Reports/Jones ,Wright, Shapiro and Keane (2014) The state of the international Order.
North Africa used to be a civilizational crossroads in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews not only lived alongside one another but also shared one another’s language and culture. The Arab Spring raised immense hopes that liberal democratic values would finally flourish in the heart of the Islamic world. The governments of established liberal democracies try to promote democracy through a number of institutional channels, including their foreign affairs ministries and development aid agencies, and by funding private, autonomous, or regional organizations, quase non-governmental organizations that have been set up to promote democracy.
The governments include those of the US, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and the Nordic countries. Of all government departments, USAID is the one that enjoys the most prominent reputation for work in the democracy and governance area. USAID receives overall foreign policy guidance form the Secretary of State.
On November 21, 2013 a new partnership agreement between Sida and USAID was formally signed at the Embassy of Sweden in Washington. The development partnership between USAID and Sidal focus on creating jobs and growth in Africa. Other European countries that hav ededicated democracy foundations funded by government include Britain WFD, Netherlands, NIMD, Australian,CDI.
Regional-level organizations that express a strong commitment to support democracy in the member states include the Organization of African Union, through its new partnership for Africa´s Development (NEPAD). Different again is the intergovernmental International Institute for Democracy and Electroal Assistance, (IDEA) based in Sweden, which works at the interface between analysing democratic trends and disseminating advice.
EU is not a state. And until quite recently foreign policy analysts were not all convinced that the lens of foreign policy could be used to illuminate the EU´s external behavior. However, the EU is becoming more than just one more intergovernmental actor. It has moved towards the adoption of a common foreign and security policy and is now one of the world´s largest foreign aid donors.
Its formal commitment to promoting democracy has grown apace. One of the most visible institutional expressions is the strategic approach to the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), matching programmes and projects in the field with EU commitments on human rights and democracy. This involves a variety of specific steps, including the issuance of the necessary.
Democracy assistance is usually consensual. It comprises grantaided support that can take the form of technical, material, and financial assistance to pro-democracy initiatives. Including what Carothers, calls “institutional modelling” attempts to transfer blueprints of democratic practice, procedure, and organizations that resemble working models already familiar in the established democracies.
The EU´s role in promoting democratic political reform in central and Eastern European countries in the 1990s, and Balkans, just as many people in the transition and post-communist societies saw democratization as an aid to recovering national independence, freedom both from authoritarian rule and from political domination by the Soviet Union. So Western Europeans saw democratic reform in the near abroad as a plus for their own security.
Conditionality serves in this context both as a promising tool of the EU to promote democracy and a theoretical framework to explain causalities between the prospect of EU membership and a successful democratisation process in the target country.
Both economic and political transformations are considered essential for countries to be considered eligible form membership of the EU. And EU expansion appealed to many existing members, although not all for the same reasons.
Other rationales include democracy´s claimed ability to secure domestic political stability and predisposition towards peaceful external relations. This remains and important challenge in the European neighbourhood. Ukraine is one such country, and it illustrates the considerable assortment of foreign and international actors that may be at work over time, acting separately and together with Poland. Poland´s politicians and civic groups have been active in countries to East.
Ukraine was seen as of interest to Eastern Europeans alone, All EU leaders – came to Vilnius in November last year for the EU summit with Eastern neighbours. Of course today Ukraine is on all our minds. As people across the country are taking to the streets, Ukraine’s political destiny is still in the balance. The events in Kiev are a matter of common concern. It is not just linked to the latest events.
Of military ties, cultural connections and trading relations Ukraine’s government will continue to depend on Russian goodwill. Agreement at the Vilnius summit seemed to confirm that Russia as an international power was on a roll: it had seen off the prospect of western intervention in Syria and launched the initiative to put Damascus’s chemical weapons under international control; it played a key role in the Iranian interim nuclear deal; and it had kept Ukraine out of the EU’s orbit.
Whatever the geopolitics; we should not confuse attitudes towards democracy assistance. For all these reasons the EU have offered Ukraine a closer association with the European Union. Not for free, but upon conditions – which were close to fulfilled. And not against the great neighbouring nation to its east, with which it shares a history and culture. The offer is still there.
European Community’s development policy stresses the importance of concentrating EC development co-operation on certain sectors. It identifies
institutional capacity building (and in particular for democracy and good governance) as a strategic area for Community activities. This applies both to coherence between European Community policies, and between those policies and other EU action, especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Can the West promote democracy? Democratization is never easy, smooth, or linear, but as Indonesia’s experience in building a multiparty and multiethnic democracy shows, it can succeed even under difficult and initially unpromising conditions.
The prospect of European Union (EU) membership is often considered the most successful instrument for the promotion of democracy in post-communist countries (Reinhard, 2010). We can observe that all post-communist members of the EU are now more or less consolidated democracies, whilst all postcommunist countries outside the EU are still on a path between open authoritarianism and hybrid regimes.
Even though the membership prospect might be a promising instrument to promote democracy in external countries, the underlying causal mechanisms have to be identified. Questioning this causality assumption Reinhards study seeks to discuss.
As the democratisation of non-Member States is both a normative and strategic aim of the EU, democracy promotion is a main element of its foreign policy. The EU has also had a strong dynamic of its own, with increase in membership potentially helping the institution to become a more powerful actor in world affairs in its own rights. Democracy promotion in nearby states has served this objective.
In fact promoting democracy anywhere can be seen both as symbol and tool of powerful actor status in world affairs. The US government has easily the highest profile. Undoubtedly governments shape their foreign policies in accord with their view of national interest, but it is also worth mentioning that many ordinary people support efforts to promote democracy too.
A sample survey (The German Marshall Fund of the US, 2005) of respondents carried out in both US and in European Union countries and Turkey found support for soft power approaches reached 75 per cent.
International peace: The democratic peace thesis was strongly endorsed in President Clinton´s support of democratization and has regularly featured in the policy rationales of most official actors. The thesis maintains that democracies do not go to war with one another (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2010). Flow of trade between states and participation in international organizations combine to inhibitinter-state conflict.
These institutionalized arrangements enabled for example many European and some Latin American countries to manage their economies with less conflict than was true for pluralist systems. The EU, winner of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize, is a project of peace. Let´s not forget that at the beginning that was the main purpose that founding fathers had.
Based on the desire to strengthen the EU as a foreign policy actor, on 18 February 2014 EIP was created. It will be an important instrument in the EU’s toolbox for managing crises and conflicts. EU historic achievement, to ensure stability and consensus between countries which for centuries has been in constant conflict with each other, shows that the Union can play an important role in the service of peace also outside Europe.
EU Human Rights diplomacy seeks to respond to the rising global challenges: European and American leaders discussing the 21st century’s most significant issues.
EU Rendez-Vous series: with The EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis
Development and democracy.
Over the last fifty years, democratization theory has developed several, at times overlapping, at times contradictory, insights and models. Empirically, there seems to be a strong correlation between levels of development and democracy. However, this reasoning has since come to be questioned, on two ground. Many African countries were simply not developing. Just as important was the rise of the intellectual proposition that politics can make a difference.
This was connected with a more general movement in the social sciences to recognize that institutions and human agency do matter; not everything is determined by structural causes. Furthermore, development was increasingly defined not just as economic growth but in terms of improved social conditions and human development.
However, some major international development agencies like the World Bank continue to stress most of all “the importance of better governance, not democracy”. This builds on arguments that the rule of law and secure property rights are more important for development than are other civil liberties or extensive political rights.
Nevertheless something of a double paradigm shift did take place: away from a belief in the economic merits of authoritarian rule within an economics first approach to development, towards a belief that democratic reform can be helpful., that is to say “modernization causes democracy”.
Attention turned to the ways in which democracy, human rights, and good governance might benefit such development. Indeed, in many cases democratization could even be essential to unlocking the developmental potential, in North Korea for instance.
These studies have built the current accumulation of knowledge about the relationship between development and democracy. It is still possible to note that little beyond greater certainty about Seymour Martin Lipset´s original claim (1959), which was then a state-of-the art quantitative test: showing a relationship between various measures of development and democracy in a cross-section of countries.
There’s been tremendous progress on poverty reduction (largely within the Brics) and improved human development (globally); but sustained progress could be eroded by rapid population growth (Wright, et al. 2014).
Carothers “institutional modelling” offers a useful categorization of democracy assistance in the shape of a democracy template. This distinguishes three sectors: electoral process, state institutions, and civil society. For each sector there are sector goals, and typical forms of democracy aid that relate to them.
The democracy promoters themselves comprise different kinds of organization, governmental, intergovernmental, semi-autonomous, and non-governmental (as already been noted). Collectively they provide the main membership of the Community of Democracies. They vary greatly in their mandates and their access to different instruments for promoting democracy.
Can the West promote democracy? In this account transitions to democracy or more generally a change in political institutions, emerges as away of regulating the future allocation of political power.
Broadly speaking, democracy assistance has evolved along a path from electoral support through an emphasis on civil society to an increased willingness in some circles to regard support for party strengthening as essential to democracy-building.
The most essential elements of democracy are the critical component of having an opposition; as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and chair of the National Democratic Institute, said recently when Brookings hosted the 10th annual Sakıp Sabancı lecture.
Albright has been a strong backer of democracy promotion, helping to found the Community of Democracies, an organization of like-minded states, in her final years in office. She has been cochair for CFR Independent Task Forces on threats to democracy and supporting Arab democracy.
The United States has paid a high price for its efforts to reengineer the politics of others. The United States spent enormous amounts of treasure and considerable blood trying to turn Iraq into a functioning multi-ethnic democracy.
On democracy in the Arab world, Albright wrote in a 2005 op-ed: “The difference between democracy and the status quo is that decisions will flow from the many, not just the few. This does not guarantee that we will agree with those decisions or that they will be the right ones, only that they will be legitimate.”
There’s simply no such thing as a one-party democracy. An opposition allows citizens to have real choices, and only when there is a real choice can the winner truly claim a mandate. Those in the opposition also have a responsibility to create an alternative that is viable and that appeals across society.
This is the essence of a “democratic context.” It is about more than just elections. A functioning democracy needs an opposition; it needs a citizenry informed by an unfettered flow of information; and it needs “checks and balances” so that an electoral majority can also protect minority rights.
It involves change along behavioural and attitudinal as well as institutional dimensions and modernization that go well outside, while helping to underpin a free and fair electoral process. The citizens demand democracy so that they can have more political say and political power tomorrow.
If they do so, they will have effectively increased their de jure political power.
Instead of non-democracy, we are now in a democratic regime where there will be voting by all. With their increased de jure political power, the citizens are therefore more likely to secure the economic institutions and policies they like tomorrow as well.
We make most progress on human rights around the world when our approach appeals to others’ enlightened self-interest and is sensitive to their culture and history. In short, we have to persuade countries and governments that respecting human rights will be beneficial to them. Dipolomatis do this strategically too, at the UN level, where we have helped enshrine the importance of rule of law, democracy and accountable institutions – what the UK Prime Minister has called the “Golden Thread” – in the UN’s new Sustainable Development Goals.
competitive party system or Representative democracies and citizens preferences.
The exploration of political conflict has also generated an important literature on contentious politic (episodic public collective action) and social movements (sustained challenge to holders of power). Modernization and the spread of democracy spawned the invention of social movements. Yet at the same time, the time and location of social movements that is, their interaction with political institutions, society, and cultural practices, determined the form in which they emerged.
Parties are seen to provide the political leadership if “good governance” is to be possible. Thus more democracy promoters are thinking about the political parties dimension, although the majority of efforts to date have not systematically aimed to at connecting supports to parties individually with the development of an effective and competitive party system appropriate to the society in question.
Authority and power play an important role in human societies, scholars from various social science discipline such as Marx (1867), Parson (1963) and Weber (1976) have contributed to our understanding of the origins, characteristics, and potential consequences of these forces.
Egypt is often cited as an example in societies that lack well organized political parties for channelling political mobilization in a manner compatible with orderly democratic rule, authoritatrian breakdown may not proceed smoothly to the installation of democracy. Instead, there is turmoil, creating opportunities for illiberal groups (uncivil society) to take charge, as happened in Iraq.
A Year after Egypt’s military deposed President Mohamed Morsi, a new regime is finally starting to take shape.
The EU,as well as the United States, and Israel has an interest in a stable Egypt that can honor the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty and defeat militants in Sinai. But an Egyptian government that persecutes its political opponents and denies them justice and any political role in society will produce only instability and violence.
In light of the 2011 popular uprising in Egypt and the subsequent political changes that are currently sweeping the region. The issue of revising the 26 March 1979 peace treaty (the first of its kind between an Arab country and the state of Israel. Carter’s Lasting Legacy Of Making Peace,) has been raised extensively in Egypt since the 2011 ‘Eilat incident’, in which unidentified gunmen attacked Israeli soldiers and civilians near the Red Sea resort town of Eilat, triggering a serious escalation in violence. The political and social transformations in the Middle East following the ‘Arab uprisings’ represent a unique opportunity for the peace process.
Beyond the systemic or functional elements of parties and party systems. Researchers have also devoted considerable efforts to understanding why parties formed in the way they did. One of central contentions of comparative work done in the 1960s was that partisan attachments and party systems had remained frozen since the advent of democracy in the West.
Parties must provide the political leadership if food governance is to be possible; and opposition parties must have the capability to hold government to account.
In the last forty years party-voter linkages have substantially thawed (Wren and McElwin 2007). Economic growth, the decline of class differences, and the emergence of post-materialist values lie in part behind this transformation. “Thus, weakening part voter ties must be put in the context of a shift in the educational level of the population, voter preferences and new technologies”.
Modern democracies are representative democracies. As such they are also party democracies: Political representatives generally coordinate in stable organizations for the purposes of contesting elections and governing.
Elections are said to achieve democratic legitimacy, accountability, and a responsive bench. Neoinstitutional scholars have focused their attention on electoral rules, executives, legislatures, federalism and, more recently, the judiciary.
Wolak and McAtee (2013) explore why people hold favorable views of the political parties in their state, in USA As the liberalism of state parties increases, liberals offer increasingly favorable evaluations of the Democratic Party, while conservatives offer increasingly negative party evaluations.
Popular support for state political parties rests in part on the policy positions these parties take and the party’s performance in office.
To what degree do people distinguish the partisan divisions of national politics from the partisan battles within their state?
Under Republican state legislatures, better economic performance translates into greater support for the party.
In democracies, how do citizens preferences get translated into demands for one public policy over another? The dominant strains of research, some of which come to grips with the social choice challenge and others of which ignore it, include examinations of the congruence (between preferences and outcomes) of constituents preferences and the issue positions of their representatives.
If everyone in a society had the same preferences, the problem would not be a problem at all. But never is this the case. Wren and McElwain draw attention to the changes in party as instrumental in many advanced democracies and examines mechanisms of participation that dominated in the past. Central finding is that institutions play role in aggregating preferences. Thus normal politics are embedded in identities and constitutions.